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THE END OF MEN OR THE REBIRTH OF CLASS? HOW HANNA ROSIN LEAVES
OUT THE 1% AND FAMILY LAW FAILS THE OTHER 99%
June Carbone and Naomi Cahn*
ABSTRACT
This article argues that much of what has been described as “the end of men” is in fact the
recreation of class. Greater inequality among men and among women has resurrected class differences
and changed the way men and women relate to each other and channel resources to their children. While
women have in fact gained ground in the workplace and acquired greater ability to live, work, play and
raise children without men, a mere relative move towards sex equality only masks the more fundamental
changes occurring in American society and the continuing existence of patriarchy..
First, the improved freedom women enjoy does not translate into greater power at the top.
Greater societal inequality has instead offset these changes by increasing elite male dominance,
marginalizing women in the in the executive ranks and the most prestigious professional circles, and
ceding political power to a conservative elite that has removed women’s issues from the public agenda.
At the height of the era that supposedly marks the “end of men,” the gendered wage gap has been
increasing for college graduates even as it declines for everyone else. In a winner-takes-most world, the
disproportionate rewards go to the alpha dogs who remain overwhelmingly male.
Second, the genuine decline of working class men does not necessarily benefit women. Instead, it
means that an increasing number of women in middle American have little choice but to raise families on
their own as the men in their lives become less reliable. As society become more unequal, it writes off a
greater percentage of men to imprisonment, chronic unemployment, substance abuse and mental
instability. The women left with low-paying but stable jobs at Walmart or Burger King have trouble
finding partners who can either contribute enough to make the relationship worthwhile or who will assist
the new female breadwinner who both brings home the bacon and cooks it. These women have
independence but neither power nor help at home.
In short, over the past several decades, men have lost ground everywhere but the top, increasing
male inequality; and, while women have gained in the middle and the bottom, they are not equal –
anywhere -- because men retain “structural power” over women. Accordingly, we conclude that for the
end of men to be a meaningful concept that describes a more egalitarian society, we must decrease
economic inequality: the result would translate greater power for women into a better deal for men and
greater investment in all children.
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Introduction

Imagine a society in which women are known through the region for their outspokenness
and wit. They have access to the same education as men. They can own, inherit and manage
property. They enjoy a relatively greater degree of sexual freedom than in nearby societies.
Would we celebrate the rise of women? Herald the “end of men”? If we learned that we had just
read a description of Sparta, would we reinterpret the results?1 The sad truth is that the
dominance of elite men can create conditions that look like the emancipation of women – and the
end of the men on the losing end of steeply graduated male hierarchies. It is nonetheless a
mistake to conflate the relatively greater advantages women enjoy in such a society with female
power. Men – and male power – remain alive and well where it counts most, and that is at the
top.
In looking at the United States today, the big story is greater income inequality and the
rise of a more dominant group of elite men. Greater societal inequality disproportionately affects
men. In today’s society, it also interacts with economic changes – the rise of the information
economy – that have changed women’s roles and remade family life. Women have benefited
from these changes. The information economy rewards the more highly educated, and women
now outnumber men at all levels of education. The remaking of the household has freed women
from labor intensive washing, cooking and cleaning obligations and women have come to
constitute almost one-half of the workforce. The combination of an expanding service sector
and the contraction of manufacturing places greater emphasis on interpersonal skills , and
modern businesses reap greater benefit from “softer” management styles. Some have heralded
the overall effect as women power; or, in the words of a spate of books and articles, beginning in
2010, “the end of men.”2 They point out that women appear to be closing the income gap and
more women than ever out earn their husbands. The sexual revolution has eliminated much of
the double standard. Women have become so free to have children on their own that over half of
births to women under thirty are non-marital. Observers concluded that women are increasingly
calling the shots and male power, influence, and earnings are in decline.
We think these conclusions are – at least partially -- misleading and cloak the
construction of a new class-based form of patriarchy. Claims about the end of men are
misleading for two interrelated reasons: first, while women’s roles are changing and more
women than ever are in college and the workplace, nonetheless, in the public sphere, in the
worlds of political power and managerial power, and in the executive suites, women are losing
ground. Second, the change between men and women hides the greater inequality in society
among men and among women. The greater inequality among men has upped the stakes
underlying mating and dating and has created a new elite. The one percent receives deservedly
disproportionate attention, but the men at the top -- at least ten percent -- have increased their
1

These descriptions come from MARCIA GUTTENTAG & PAUL F. SECORD, TOO MANY WOMEN?: THE SEX
RATIO QUESTION 47 (1983).
2
See, e.g., Hanna Rosin, The End of Men, THE ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 2010,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/07/the-end-of-men/8135/. See generally HANNA ROSIN, THE
END OF MEN: AND THE RISE OF WOMEN (2012); LIZA MUNDY, THE RICHER SEX: HOW THE NEW MAJORITY OF
FEMALE BREADWINNERS IS TRANSFORMING SEX, LOVE AND FAMILY (2012).
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dominance as well. Greater inequality increases the dominance of elite men, cedes political
power to a conservative elite that has removed women’s issues from the agenda, worsens the
income and status of non-elite men, and destabilizes families. In short, over the past several
decades, men have lost ground everywhere but the top, increasing male inequality; and, while
women have gained in the middle and the bottom, they are not equal – anywhere -- because men
retain “structural power” over women. 3
The result of these "winner take all" changes that handsomely reward a narrow,
increasingly male, elite while the rest of the country stagnates, is to increase the consequences of
family investment. For those who do not succeed in the new high stakes game -- the eighty
percent, if not the 99 percent -- the result is likely to be downward mobility. The figures on the
"end of men" largely describe the middle managers and working class men at the losing end of
these changes.
The combination of the high stakes mating game at the top, family instability in the
center, and female independence (with a fair amount of desperation) at the bottom is the
recreation of the family as an engine driving class divergence. Marriage once served to
promote greater equality as executives married their secretaries, the mothers of young children
overwhelmingly tended the home4, and men of all social classes worked similar hours. Today,
executives marry fellow executives, concentrating family investment in the elite of the next
generation. In the meantime, the “end of men” means that women in other social classes are
increasingly giving up on the men who are on the losing end of the social transformations. The
consequence of the transformed marriage market has made marriage into an issue of class, so
that only at higher incomes do traditional families thrive. Evolving family norms implement and
reinforce the new system. At the top, the elite continues to raise their children within stable,
planned two parent families, with women taking more responsibility for children and more likely
to opt out of the highest career tracks.5 Below that, divorce rates are at all-time highs and nonmarital births are exploding. These women neither have the option of opting out of work nor the
ability to find family friendly workplaces that make it possible to do justice to their families.
This is not the world that many people imagine when they fantasize about the end of
men. Instead, this world ironically owes more to the return of hierarchy among men than
genuine societal power by women. Accordingly, we conclude with recommendations for
institutionalizing women’s equality that depend on decreasing economic inequality – the result
would translate greater power for women into a better deal for men and greater investment in all
children.
I.

The Rise of Women or the Recreation of Class?

The last half century has seen fundamental changes in the economy. These changes
increased the demand for the type of labor women have historically performed (think nurses and
waitresses), decreased the premium for physical labor and long serving middle managers (think
3

See GUTTENTAG supra note 1, at 26 (1983).
This was the pervasive model, albeit one never obtained by black women or poor women.
5
See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why Women Still Can’t Have It All, THE ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 2012,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/why-women-still-cant-have-it-all/309020/.
4
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men), and dramatically increased CEO pay, the wealth of the financial sector, and the value of
executive stock options (think Jared Diamond, George Soros or Mitt Romney).6 The
consequences are dramatically greater inequality, more opportunities for women than in eras in
which they were systemically excluded from the labor market, and much greater dominance of
the overwhelmingly male one percent. These changes are having a dramatic effect on society
and the family.
The question is why call these effects the “end of men?” We could just as well call them
the rise of the elephant seals – economist Bob Franks’ description of what happens in a winnertake-all community when the alpha males compete to see who can develop the largest tusks or
Cayman Island accounts at the expense of the community as a whole.7 We believe that the rise
of women needs to be placed in the context of increased male inequality. If women ran the
world, we suspect that the men on the losing end of today’s economic changes would be better
off and women’s gains in education and income would be less remarkable. Let’s give End of
Men’s its due, however, and start with a picture of the changes in the status of women.
A. The Rise of Women?
Women have made enormous strides in gaining access to higher education and the
workplace. Most of the change occurred during the seventies, the height of the women’s
movement. The birth of the information economy – with greater demand for women’s market
labor -- set the stage. The sex revolution and access to the pill and abortion helped. Claudia
Goldin and Lawrence Katz emphasized that in a few short years legal changes that made
abortion legal and contraception available on college campuses had an immediate impact on the
average age of marriage, overall fertility, and women’s ability to attend professional and
graduate schools.8 Laws prohibiting sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and pregnancy
discrimination helped secured women’s advances. These changes, together with parallel changes
in the economy that increased the demand for women’s labor, had an enormous impact on
women’s workforce participation and earnings. They were, however, largely complete by the
mid-eighties. Let’s look at the numbers.
The percentage of college degrees awarded to women in 1970 was 42%; today it is 57%,
a percentage that has been unchanged over the last decade.9 Women are much more likely to
participate in the workforce in 2010 than in 1970 (although less likely than in 1980 – 56.8% in
1970, 64.4% in 1980, and 63.3% in 2010).10 The overall wage gap between men and women
has narrowed substantially from 1970, when women earned 59% of what men earned; today,

6

Alexander Eichler, Gender Wage Gap is Higher on Wall Street Than Anywhere Else, March 19, 2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/19/gender-wage-gap-wall-street_n_1362878.html.
7
ROBERT H. FRANK, THE DARWIN ECONOMY: LIBERTY, COMPETITION, AND THE COMMON GOOD (2011).
8

Goldin, Claudia & Katz, L. F. (2002). The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and Women’s Career and
Marriage Decisions, 110 J.. POL. ECON.,730..
9

Susan Aud et al., THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2012 259 tbl.A-38-1 (Thomas Nachazel et al. eds.,
2012), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012045.pdf.
10
U.S. Census Bureau, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012 384 tbl.597 (2012), available
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/labor.pdf.
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women earn 77% of what men earn (although the biggest gains occurred before 1980).11 And
yes, while wives’ earnings contributed 26.6% of total family income in 1970, they contribute
37.1% today, an increase of more than one-third.12 Similarly, the number of married couples in
which both husband and wife are wage-earners has increased substantially as well, from 45.7%
in 1970 to 55.3% ; the number of families in which the husband is the sole wage earner has
decreased almost 50% (from 33.3% in 1970 to 18% today), while the number of families in
which the wife is the sole wage-earner has more than tripled, albeit from an almost insignificant
1.9% in 1970 to a still small 6.6% today.13 Women have in fact gained in education, income,
and status. Before we celebrate too much, however, let’s consider who the really big winners
have been.
B. Income Inequality and Elite Male Dominance
Over the last twenty years, the single biggest change in the U.S. economy has been the
increase in income inequality. The inequality in wages is the highest it has been in a century.14
Between 1980 and 2005, the United States enjoyed considerable growth and productivity gains,
but 80 percent of the increase in income went to the top one percent of U. S. earners.15 Those at
the very top, the 99.99th percentile, increased their income between 1985 and 2005 by a factor of
5 (amounting to an increase of over $4 million of year), while those below the 99.00th percentile
showed relatively modest gains, and income stagnated for those below the top quintile.16
Putting the overall picture together, Congressional budget office figures show that the highest
fifth increased their after-tax earnings by 95 percent between 1979 and 2007 in comparison with
a 25 percent increase in middle fifth of households and a sixteen percent increase for the bottom
fifth.
Now, let’s consider the gender breakdown underlying these figures, beginning with the
professions. Women have dramatically increased their representations among doctors and
lawyers, and the most highly paid professionals have increased their incomes substantially. Yet,
women have also lost ground in recent years. Women constitute slightly less than one-third of
all physicians and surgeons, and earn 71% of what men earn.17 Indeed, the gender gap has
widened for starting salaries, rising from a difference of $3,600 in 1999 to $16,819 in 2008.18
Researchers conclude that the gap cannot be explained by specialty choice, practice setting, work
hours, or other characteristics. In law, the differences are smaller, but the percentage of women
11

Am. Ass’n of Univ. Women, THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE GENDER PAY GAP 2012 EDITION 3 fig.1
(2012), available at http://www.aauw.org/learn/research/upload/simpletruthaboutpaygap1.pdf
12
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 77 tbl.24
(2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2011.pdf.
13
Id. at 76 tbl.23.
14
Timothy Noah, The United States of Inequality, SLATE (Sept. 3, 2010, 3:06 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_great_divergence/features/2010/the_united_states_of_inequalit
y/introducing_the_great_divergence.html.
15
Id.
16
Bartels, supra, at 10-11.
17
Id. at 58.
18
Anthony T. Lo Sasso, Michael R. Richards, Chiu-Fang Chou & Susan E. Gerber, The $16,819 Pay Gap
for Newly Trained Physicians: The Unexplained Trend of Men Earning More Than Women, 30 HEALTH AFF. 193
(2011).
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in law school peaked in 2001 and has been declining since then. With the decline in graduates,
the pipeline into law firms has been also been declining modestly over the last ten years.
Women continue to hold about 15% of equity partnerships, the most lucrative positions in the
legal profession and that figure has been largely unchanged for twenty years.19 Firms, however,
have also moved toward different compensation tiers, and women do not fare as well in the new
systems as they did in firms with a single partnership level.20
Further exacerbating the exclusion of women from the top income ranks is the change in
the financial sector – the sector of the economy whose income grew most rapidly over the last
twenty years.21 The six jobs with the largest gender gap in pay and at least 10,000 men and
10,000 women were in the Wall Street-heavy financial sector: insurance agents, managers,
clerks, securities sales agents, personal advisers and other specialists.22 Moreover, while the
percentage of women in business schools has increased to almost half, the number of women on
Wall Street has dropped off since 2000. In 2008 and 2009, the number of sexual harassment
charges per woman in the financial industry grew higher.23 Total compensation for executives
tripled over the last fifteen years,24 with the ratio of CEO compensation to average worker pay
increasing by at least a factor of ten.25 Yet, according to a 2010 report, women constitute only 2
percent of chief executive officers (CEOs), 14 percent of top executives, and 16 percent of
directors at Fortune 500 companies26 Women are losing out in the sectors of the economy where
compensation was most rapidly increasing.
In the highly lucrative tech sector, the overall percentage of women has been falling. Ten
years ago, women earned 28.1% of all computer and information sciences bachelor’s degrees;
today, they earn 18.1%.27 Or take engineering, where 18.6% of the degrees were awarded to
women a decade ago, but only 16.8% were awarded more recently28 (a small decrease, but a
19

The Nat’l Ass’n of Women Lawyers & The Nat’l Ass’n of Women Lawyers Found., REPORT OF THE
SIXTH ANNUAL NATIONAL SURVEY ON RETENTION AND PROMOTION OF WOMEN IN LAW FIRMS 3 (2011), available
at
http://nawl.timberlakepublishing.com/files/NAWL%202011%20Annual%20Survey%20Report%20FINAL%20Publ
ication-ready%2011-9-11.pdf.
20
Id.at 5.
21
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 62 (2011).
22
Frank Bass, Shining Shoes Best Way Wall Street Women Outearn Men, BLOOMBERG (March 16, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-16/shining-shoes-best-way-wall-street-women-outearn-men.html.
23
Alexander Eichler, Gender Wage Gap Is Higher On Wall Street Than Anywhere Else, HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/19/gender-wage-gap-wall-street_n_1362878.html.
24
Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 49, 51 (2003)
(reporting and discussing executive option grants).
25
Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein & Sylvia Allegretto, THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2006/2007,
(2007), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1027&context=books; see
also Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, Executive Compensation: A New View From a Long-Term Perspective,
1936-2005, Fed. Reserve Bd. Div. of Research & Statistics & Monetary Aff. Finance & Economics Discussion
Series, Working Paper No. 2007-35, July 6, 2007), available
at http://federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2007/200735/200735abs.html (growth of CEO pay relative to worker pay
increased from 30:1 in 1970 to 120:1 by 2000).
26
Rachel Soares, Jan Combopiano, Allyson Regis, Yelena Shur & Rosita Wong, 2010 CATALYST CENSUS:
FORTUNE 500 WOMEN EXECUTIVE OFFICERS AND TOP EARNERS, CATALYST.ORG (2010),
http://catalyst.org/file/412/2010_us_census_women_executive_officers_and_top_earners_final.pdf.
27
Aud, supra note 9, at 259 tbl.A-38-1.
28
Id.
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decrease nonetheless). Even though women graduate from college in greater numbers than men,
they have lost ground in gaining entry to the most remunerative degrees and positions.
C. Gender and the Recreation of Class
In light of these changes, let’s revisit the statistics that show women’s gains vis-à-vis
men. Like other statistics, they show dramatic variation by class and race. We start with college
graduation rates, where women now outperform the men. Break down these figures by race and
income, however, and we see a different story. Among whites with family incomes above
$70,000 per year, the percentage of males versus females attending college dropped from 52 to
49% from the mid-nineties to 2003-04. At 49-51, however, the number of men and women
attending college is almost the same. The more significant drop in male college attendance came
in the middle income ranks ($30,000 to 70,000) where the percentage of men fell from 50 to
43% and the low income group where it fell to 42%. For African-Americans, the percentage of
men in the top group increased during the same period, reaching 48%, almost indistinguishable
from the white rate. Elite Latinos showed patterns similar to whites. Middle income AfricanAmericans and Latinos, however, reported that only 42% of their college students in the middle
income group were male, and for the low-income students in 2003-04, only 36% of the blacks
and 39% of the Latinos were male. In other words, as the economy has weakened, the big fall
off has been in the college attendance of low income men. The men from elite families,
whatever their race, are still in college.29
Let’s turn to the much heralded change in the wage gap. In the seventies and eighties, the
gender wage gap narrowed and did so overwhelmingly because of increases in income to highly
skilled women.30 Comparing 1990 with 2007, however, the figures diverge strikingly by
education. Looking at gross figures, that is, the percentage of men’s median income earned by
women without controlling for any characteristic other than education, the wage gap over the last
twenty years narrowed the most for the least educated women while the gap between men and
women increased for the most educated:
Female Median Income as a Percentage of Male Median Income by Education31

29

Mary Beth Marklein, College Gender Gaps Widens: 57% are Women, USA TODAY (Oct. 19, 2005,
11:41 p.m.), http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2005-10-19-male-college-cover_x.htm
30
Francine Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The U.S. Gender Pay Gap in the 1990s: Slowing Convergence 17
(Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section, Working Paper No. 508, March 1, 2006),
http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01gb19f581g (finding that wage gains for married women in the 1970s and
1980s tended to be greatest for women married to middle and high wage men).
31
Median Annual Income, by Level of Education, 1990-2008, INFOPLEASE (2007),
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0883617.html#ixzz1JFxpOxL9 (last visited OctNov. 17,1, 2011).
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Exacerbating the loss of blue collar male status was a change in employment stability.
The length the average man or women stays in a particular job has diminished substantially over
the last thirty years, but the impact has been substantially greater for the working class.36 In the
1970’s, the differences in job stability did not vary much by education. After 2000, the job
instability figures for the most educated remained about the same as the figures for the seventies.
But they increased by a third for the other males. 37
The disappearance of “good jobs” with decent pay, increasing benefits over time, and
employment stability has had a significant impact on blue collar men. At the height of the Great
Compression, the period of relative income equality between 1945 and the mid-seventies, male
leisure time did not vary much by class; today, it does.38 Charles Murray documents the changes
in employment since1960 in a prototypical white upper class community (Belmont) and a
prototypical white working class town (Fishtown). In the middle of the twentieth century, the
number of men who worked less than forty hours a week was low – about 10 percent in Fishtown,
the working class community, and 8 percent in Belmont, the more affluent area. By 2010, the
percentage of men working less than forty hours a week had doubled in Fishtown to 20 percent
while rising more modestly to about 12 percent in Belmont.39 The figures are higher still in
African-American communities and have been since good blue collar jobs began to disappear in
the sixties.
Nor do the employment figures alone capture the impact on working class communities. A
remarkable book, The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger, suggests that
greater inequality itself makes matter worse. Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett present a crosscultural study that examines the impact of greater inequality across different countries and
different states in the United States. Their 2009 study found that income inequality had a greater
impact on societies than poverty rates and that greater inequality lowered levels of trust,
educational achievement and social mobility and increased rates of mental illness (including
substance abuse), obesity, teenage births, homicides and imprisonment rates.40
Greater inequality has had a disproportionate impact on the lives of low and middle
income men and that, much more than women’s gains, may account for much of the “end of men.”

contribute. Id. at 16. In addition, the less education a woman has the less likely she is to be in the labor market.
Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children are Faring Under the Second Demographic Transition, 41
DEMOGRAPHY 607, 608 (2004). When looking at a husband’s education, however, the figures even out, with college
educated men being the least likely to have a working spouse. Fry & Cohn, supra note 34, at 16.
36
See Henry Farber, Is the Company Man an Anachronism? Trends in Long Term Employment in the U.S.,
1973-2006 (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section, Working Paper No. 518, Sept. 11, 2007),
http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01ft848q61h.
37
For a broader discussion of these trends, see Arne L. Kalleberg, GOOD JOBS, BAD JOBS: THE RISE OF
POLARIZED AND PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1970S-2000S (2011). He observed that
aggregate figures sometimes show relatively little change in job stability in the United States, but the averages cloak
important differences as employment instability has increased for: men, but not women; high-school graduates and
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II.

The Family

The second, much more complicated, part of the “End of Men,” has been the impact on
the family. Women have indubitably gained power in family matters and perhaps the most
important component of their increased power is the ability to leave unhappy relationships.41
Women’s greater economic independence means that they no longer need to rely on a
breadwinning male to provide financial support, and divorce reform streamlined the ease of
breakups, reinforcing equal parenting and economic sharing.42 The result has increased women’s
influence inside and outside of relationships. Economists Betsey Stephenson and Justin Wolfers
report, for example, that divorce reform is associated with a thirty percent decline in domestic
violence and a significant drop in women’s suicide rates.43
While the gain in women’s ability to make it on their own is substantial, women’s ability
to enter into relationships of their choosing is far more mixed. In an influential book in the
eighties, sociologists Marcia Guttentag and Paul Secord explored the relationship between what
they termed “structural” or societal power and “dyadic” power or power to choose
relationships.44 Ordinarily, the ratio of men to women determines dyadic power. If men
outnumber women in a community, for example, the women would gain greater ability to
determine the terms of relationships. Yet, their ability to do so might depend on the power they
held within society. In the United States in the nineteenth century, male Chinese immigrants
outnumbered the females by 20-1 at a time when the states forbade interracial marriages.45 The
few Asian women in the country, if able to fend for themselves, could have had their choice of
suitors. Yet, the women, who were immensely valuable to whoever controlled sexual access to
them, had very little individual power. They were often forced into prostitution and forbidden to
marry. 46 Their lack of societal power meant that the women could not realize the benefits from
their increase in intimate or “dyadic” power.
In the United States, the relationship between structural power and dyadic power varies
by class. At the top, high income men have increased their structural power, but still outnumber
high income women. At the bottom, marriageable women substantially outnumber marriageable
men and have since good blue collar jobs first began to disappear. Rosin’s stories are most
persuasive in describing the change in the relationship between men and women in the middle.
She describes women in a small town in Alabama who keep their families afloat after the town’s
principal employer closed the factory that once employed a sizeable percentage of the town’s
men. What she doesn’t say is that this is one of the groups who have seen the greatest increase
in divorce rates. She also describes younger couples in a coastal Virginia community. The
women are the go-getters, the men the slackers. Young couples have children without marrying,
most often because the mothers see little point in tying family well-being too closely to
unreliable men. Rosin opens one of the chapters with a description of Calvin and Bethany, who
41
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have had a child together. Marriage is not part of the picture. Bethany explains, “But Calvin
would just mean one less granola bar for the two of us.”47 In these communities, women have
gained in influence while the men’s income and status have fallen.
If we treat the search for the right mate as a market, women at the top have gained the
most in terms of the changes in supply and demand. The supply of elite men has increased and
with it the demand for women with high income and education. In another era, the best educated
women were less likely to marry than the average women. Today, those with the most education
and the highest incomes are the most likely to be married and to be married in stable
relationships that include two incomes and flexible gender roles. Farther down the socioeconomic ladder in contrast, marriage is rapidly disappearing in large part because the women
have outpaced the men. And while Rosin paints a cheery picture of single mothers preferring to
make it on their own, their children are falling farther behind the children in two-parent families
whose combined resources offer greater advantages.48 The class-based changes in family
structure reinforce class-based inequality. Write off a high percentage of men as effectively
unmarriageable, and women tend to give up on men – and marriage – more generally. The result
once again may or may not be “the end of blue collar men,” but it is definitely the recreation of
class.
A. Remade Marriages at the Top: The True Feminist Triumph
In the United States today, marriage and dating markets increasingly reflect class. We
have argued elsewhere that the college educated middle class has adopted a new family strategy:
invest in both men and women’s earning power and delay marriage until the point of emotional
maturity and financial independence.49 Both the delay in marriage and the increase in women’s
earning capacity have made it more likely that the well-off will marry each other.50 UCLA
researchers specifically tested the effect of the age of marriage and found that the likelihood that
similarly educated adults will marry each other increases with later marriage.51
In a more recent study, Christine Schwartz observed that as “women’s labor force
participation has grown, men may have begun to compete for high-earning women just as
women have traditionally competed for high-earning men.” She notes that as men and women
both look for high earning mates, couples become more likely to marry others with similar
earning power.52 Men are increasingly looking for women who will “pull their own weight” in
marriage. She shows further that the greatest changes occurred at the top; that is, the wives of
the men with the greatest earnings showed the largest gains in overall income. This is partly
47
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because high earning men have become more likely to marry high earning women and partly
because the women have become less likely to drop out of the labor market after marriage.53 In
today’s competitive world, high earning men feel they need high earning partners to afford the
good life in cities like New York, San Francisco, Chicago or D.C.54
Completing the picture is a study from the Hamilton Project. It shows that marriage rates
have decreased for almost everyone – except the women at the highest income levels. The chart
showing the change is stunning. For all men between the ages of 30 and 50, the percentage
married has declined. Even at the top, where income levels have increased substantially, the
percentage of married men has fallen, albeit less than for other men. 55 For women in the top 5%
of the income distribution, however, the percentage between the ages of 30 and 50 who are
married has increased by over 10% while declining for every other group.56 . High earning (and
presumably high powered) women used to be a turnoff; now they are the prime catches in the
marriage market. And, because of competition within this narrow market, they are in the
strongest of positions to “put a ring on it.”
These figures bear out Guttentag and Secord’s prediction that as the ratio of men to
women increases, so do women’s marriage rates. As we indicated above, the gendered wage gap
for college graduates has grown, and as it has, the number of high income men continues to
outnumber the number of high income women, particularly among whites. This group has held
the line on non-marital births, seen its divorce rates fall, and the likelihood that a fourteen-yearold will be living with both biological parents increase.57 Moreover, the group as a whole reports
high rates of marital happiness and satisfaction.58 Paul Amato concludes that “[e]conomic
security combined with gender equality appears to be a good recipe for ensuring marital
success.”59 The highly sought after women with high incomes may not have gained as much as
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the men in elite corporate boardrooms, but they have gained the most power of any group in
setting the terms of continuing access to the bedroom.
B. The Disappearance of Marriage at the Bottom: Gender Distrust Magnified
Rosin’s description of the women going it alone – rejecting marriage to the fathers of
their children even if the men are willing – is a story of tough, competent women taking charge
of their own lives.60 Rosin’s story is also one of male failure, of the men who will never be able
to “drive up in a Chevy and take [their] rightful place at the head of the table.”61 The
combination of the two, however, does not typically end with an adjustment of male and female
roles into more flexible family arrangements. The number of male full-time homemakers is still
tiny. Studies further indicate that as women earn more money, they do less housework, but only
until the point where they contribute 51% of the family income – then they do more, perhaps to
shore up their husbands’ fragile egos.62 The statisticians tell us that the husband’s loss of a high
paying job together with the homemaker mom’s entry into the workplace to compensate is a
prescription for divorce rather than the transformation of men into “mediocre house dudes.”63
We have seen this story before and, in the end, it becomes a story of gender distrust rather than
remade terms for companionship. 64
In these terms, the most dramatic story in the United States is the story of the AfricanAmerican underclass. Rosin doesn’t mention Daniel Patrick Moynihan, whose infamous report
on the black family touched off a firestorm in 1965. She does, however, repeat his claim that
poor inner-city communities have become “matriarchies,” with “women making all the decisions
and dictating what the men should and should not do.”65 We agree with Rosin that women’s
power in society has increased with greater income. Even the poorest women have seen an
increase in income over the last thirty years compared to the men in their lives.66 And women
are more independent, with greater ability to have children on their own and manage their own
lives.67 This greater independence and societal power does give women greater ability to refuse
to enter into or stay in relationships. It does not, however, necessarily translate into the ability to
dictate “what the men should and should not do” within relationships.
Again, Guttentag and Secord provide an alternative perspective. They argue that, given a
particular level of societal power, gender ratios have a critical impact on the terms of
60
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relationships and that when the number of attractive men declines, the ability of women to enter
into relationships on terms of their choosing declines. To the extent men can easily enter into
relationships with other women, women’s increased independence means more singles, not
better (or at least more amenable) male behavior. Guttentag and Secord examined, for example,
the impact of sex ratios on African-American family patterns as a key chapter in their book.
They looked at a variety of studies including one that linked family patterns to male availability
and found that African-American single parent families varied from 2.9 percent in North Dakota
where the sex ratio was 160 to 33 percent in New York where the sex ratio was 86. They
concluded that:
. . . it is clear that the stability of black families has nothing to do with matriarchy
or with any other social/cultural properties distinctive to blacks. Instead, it is a function of
the sex ratio and of economic factors. In high sex ratio states where black men are
abundant and black women relatively scarce, family stability is marked. Under these
circumstances, black men make a long-term parental investment in their children, and
illegitimate births, divorce and separation, and single-parent families headed by women
are relatively low.68
The studies on which Guttentag and Secord relied in the eighties were limited. Since then,
more sophisticated studies have found that the number of employed men had a more statistically
significant effect than aggregate sex ratios. The employment figures also explained more of the
racial differences in marriage patterns than welfare availability or women’s employment (which at
the margin had a positive effect on marriage rates.)69 In other words, women’s independence,
through greater employment, did not depress marriage rates. What did was the unavailability of
“good” men.
More recently, the Fragile Families Project has looked at the effect of mate availability on
both the transition to marriage and relationship quality outside of marriage. The Project studies
unmarried women at the time they give birth and tracks the progress of their relationship with the
father of the child afterwards. The majority of the women in these studies have a relationship
with the father at the time of the birth and many of the couples hope to marry eventually, although
the majority will break up without doing so. In 2004, Kristin Hartnett and Sara McLanahan
concluded that their “most striking finding” was that the supply of alternative partners has “a large
influence on the parents’ decision whether to marry after a non-marital birth or not.” In addition,
given the significantly lesser availability of African-American men than men of other races, it also
explained a large part of the racial differences in marriage rates.70 Indeed, the supply of
alternative partners was a more powerful predictor of the likelihood of marriage than individual
factors such as attitudes towards marriage or gender roles. In addition, higher sex ratios correlate
not just with marriage, but with relationship quality among cohabiting couples, measured by
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factors such as the degree of conflict, paternal support for the mother and involvement with the
children, and the likelihood that the man had fathered additional children with other women.71
The change in the ratio of marriageable men to marriageable women does not just depress
the marriage rates of the unemployed. It is a rippling effect that affects the norms for everyone in
a given relationship market. As the number of black men whom black women were willing to
marry, for example, declined in poor communities, the more desirable men found that they could
play the field. 72 They did not need to commit to a relationship to gain sexual access to a woman
or to have children with her. The more attractive the man to a particular woman, often because of
higher income or better employment prospects, the greater became his negotiating power. And
the fewer similar alternatives she had, the more “attractive” the employed man became. So if
greater unemployment reduces the number of men women regard as worthy partners, the greater
the advantage of those men who are employed. And, as Rick Banks has acknowledged,73 the ratio
between African-American men with college degrees and female African-American college
graduates is lower than the ratio for high school graduates, 74 increasing the bargaining power of
male college graduates even more than for high school graduates. The result is not an inevitable
product of race or class differences. Instead, it is the result of a change in the terms on which
relationships are available, depressing the attractiveness of committed relationships – and
exacerbating gender distrust.
This analysis draws sharp distinctions between women’s societal power and independence
versus women’s control of the relationships available to them. Studies of marriage indicate that
both women at the top and the bottom of society are more independent than they once were.
Indeed, in an absolute sense, wealthier women have greater ability than poor women to forego
marriage and raise children on their own. Nonetheless, the women with the highest
socioeconomic status also have the ability to participate in relationship markets where the supply
of attractive men exceeds the supply of women. Given the choice, they choose to marry and to
marry men with relatively egalitarian attitudes about gender.75 Poorer women, in contrast, face a
declining supply of attractive men, which increases the ability of the successful men in their
communities to enjoy their access to multiple women without commitment and the ability of the
less successful to enter into relationships with fewer contributions to the family’s well-being. The
women in these communities exercise their greater societal power and independence to forego
committed relationships altogether.
C. The Fate of the Middle: The Remade Terms of Family Life
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Growing inequality in American society – and the disappearance of “good jobs” for blue
collar men -- suggests that the middle of the socio-economic spectrum will increasingly resemble
the bottom in terms of the ability of women to manage satisfying relationships. Indeed, Rosin
reports today that “[b]y nearly every important social measure, Middle America is starting to
look like high-school-dropout America. “76 As we mentioned above, divorce rates for high
school graduates resemble those of high school drops, while the divorce rates of college grads
have plummeted. 77 Non-marital birth rates for the middle have skyrocketed while they have
held steady at 2 percent for white college graduates.78 And as Guttentag and Secord would
predict, as the percentage of employed men on the marriage market shrinks, norms shift away
from committed relationships.
When asked whether “marriage has not worked out for the people they know,” only
seventeen percent of college graduates agreed, compared with forty percentage of those with only
high school degrees and over half of high school dropouts.79 In the meantime, the percentage of
women between the ages of 25 and 44 who report having had three or more sex partners over their
lifetimes also changed. It was about the same for all educational groups in 1995. Since then the
number has declined to fifty-seven percent for the most educated and risen to seventy percent for
those in the middle.80
While the studies of the white working class are not as detailed as the studies of poor
minority communities, those studies that do exist refer to the same factors Rosin describes: the
disappearance of stable male employment that pays a family wage and women’s increased
workforce participation.81 These accounts are not nearly as triumphal, however, about the role of
women. They describe women struggling to hang onto family unfriendly positions when they
would prefer to be home with their children.82 They describe laid-off men, who do not take up
the slack at home, but engage in much greater rates of substance abuse and violence. And they
describe children falling farther behind their upper class peers.
Paul Amato and his colleagues provide one of the best accounts. Like Rosin, they
examine the impact of women’s greater workforce participation, focusing in particular on
married couples. For most, the results are sanguine: women’s employment increases family
financial security without disrupting marital stability.83 Nonetheless, the researchers found two
distinct groups among working women. The first were career women. These women fit Rosin’s
model well. They expected to be in the labor market, held high-paying satisfying jobs, and
associated employment with feelings of accomplishment.84 A second group of working wives,
however, had entered the labor market to make ends meet. They were more likely to be married
to working class men, whose income had stagnated or whose job instability had increased.
These women were much more likely to experience low job satisfaction, to feel that the jobs
76
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interfered with their home life, and to prefer to work fewer hours.85 The working class women
were also less likely to work in flexible positions or to be able to afford additional domestic
help.86 For these women, their husband’s diminished prospects decreased their overall
happiness, even if the additional income made them more independent.
These accounts are consistent with Rosin’s. The men suffer reverses and can’t cope. The
women, who now have the independence to kick the disappointing blokes out of the house,
manage as best they can. These women, however, are scrapping by rather than thriving. And if
the trends Rosin identifies persist, the women will face diminished opportunities for new
relationships. Passive underperforming men are one thing; alcoholic, abusive, unfaithful and
unreliable men are another. Guttentag and Secord suggest that as the number of marriageable
men declines, women may gain greater independence, but not greater commitment.
III.

Reconstructing Community

Rosin’s account ends with more women finding ways into the corner office and the
slacker dude with whom she opened the book applying to nursing school. She writes, “a new
kind of alpha female has appeared, stirring up anxiety and, occasionally, fear . . . In fact, the
more women dominate, the more they behave, fittingly, like the dominant sex.” We suspect,
however, that if women were in fact to gain greater societal power, they would want more than
individual success or more supportive domestic partners. We believe that what they would want
is a more equal society. Wary of the traps of essentialization, we nonetheless note that while
some women certainly want money and power and others want independence, women as a group
are more likely than men as a group to prefer healthier and more egalitarian communities.
In this account, we have emphasized the relationship between the growth of class-based
inequality, and particularly greater income variance among men, and the so-called “rise of
women.” The rise in power of the overwhelmingly male one percent has set the terms for
women’s rise, and we suspect on terms women would not choose if they enjoyed greater political
and societal decision-making power.
This rise in inequality in the United States has come with much greater emphasis on
values women as a group do not share, such as hierarchy, lesser support for government
generally, and, in particular, for regulations that promote health and safety, and for assistance for
children, the poor, and the unfortunate. An agenda that truly reflected the rise of women would
accordingly start with a more equal and just society.
Consider women’s political loyalties. If only women voted, Democrats would run the
country and President Obama would win re-election in a landslide. A recent Fox News poll, for
example, found Obama leading Romney 53 to 39 percent among women while losing among
men, 48 to 42 percent.87 Women are also significantly more likely to be Democrats than men
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(53 to 42%), a gender gap that dates back to at least 1990.88 For more than a decade, women
have had a more favorable view of government action than men (45 to 36% in 2011). Recent
surveys find that higher percentages of women than men support greater government assistance
for the poor (61% of women in comparison with 52% of men say that the government does not
do enough), children (62 to 52%), and the elderly (65 to 54%).89 Women also favored stronger
government regulation of food production and packaging (61 to 45%), workplace safety and
health (by 13 points) and in environmental protection (by nine points).90
Political scientists indicate that, in fact, women’s worldviews differ substantially from
men’s. Men, for example, are likely to justify the existing system and to embrace a social
dominance orientation that supports competition and hierarchy.91 Women in contrast tend to
have more egalitarian attitudes, and egalitarians are more likely to favor support for
disadvantaged groups, social welfare programs, and gun control.92 A woman’s agenda, that is,
one supported more by women than men, would cut defense spending, increase taxes, provide
more for the bottom, and strengthen communities and families.
Instead, contemporary politics reflects the rise of the 1%, and the increasing political
dominance of “angry white males.”93 The ensuing policies, which block further economic
equality for women and blue collar men,94 in turn increase women’s dependence on access to
male income at the top (even if higher female income is the way to get there) and marginalize the
women in the middle and the bottom who are making it on their own. The major threat to
working class men is other men. Middle class women have lost ground vis-à-vis more powerful
men in terms of having their interests heard: they have not gained in their ability to secure
resources for their children, fashion family flexible work environments or good schools.
Indeed, the lack of paid family leave and related benefits disproportionately disadvantages single
parents – who remain overwhelmingly women.
A true women’s agenda would therefore constrain hierarchy and limit the ability of the
one percent to dictate national priorities. It would focus on rebuilding community, and providing
for those who would otherwise lose out. We expect that such an agenda would devote greater
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resources to education and children, focusing on ethical decisionmaking and obligation towards
children, not promoting marriage as an end in itself or as a substitute for real solutions to
poverty. It would make workplaces more family friendly and families more central to national
policy. It would seek to include all of those who can contribute in the productive life of the
nation. It would create jobs, with particular attention to job stability, acknowledging the need for
a social safety net that provides adequate health care and retirement security.
Perhaps most of all, such policies, in their efforts to limit the effects of greater
inequality, would mark the rebirth of marginalized men.
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